During their rebellion, the insurgents arrived at the nuclear facility with the aim of obtaining compact nuclear weapons from the Soviet era in order to escalate the situation, as stated by Kyrylo Budanov, the director of Ukraine’s military intelligence.
Throughout the Wagner occasion, the White House representative affirmed that the United States “did not receive any indication at any juncture that nuclear weapons or materials were in jeopardy.” The spokesperson further mentioned their inability to verify the report.
To enhance transparency on this matter, our most recent Nuclear Notebook presents a more comprehensive summary of Russian nuclear capabilities. Specifically, we examine the information provided by U.S. And NATO sources regarding Russian nuclear landmines and non-strategic nuclear forces.
Does the episode prompt the inquiry as to whether Russia still possesses nuclear “backpacks” or landmines, if the nuclear weapons potentially stored there were in jeopardy, or if the Wagner rebels reached or approached a Russian nuclear weapons storage facility (or what their intentions were)?
The status of Russian landmines from the Cold War era is uncertain, but they are considered to be part of the operational forces or leftover remnants. A report from the U.S. Department of State in 2023, including intelligence reports from the U.S. Intelligence Community, repeatedly refers to them. The answer appears to be yes, at least in some form.
Prior to analyzing that inquiry, it is beneficial to initially review the statements made by U.S. And NATO sources regarding Russian landmines.
According to reports, these reports listed them as a guide for defense intelligence agencies, but the wording in these reports may indicate a lower level of confidence or the possibility that they were “may have” been. An example of this concern about the danger of loose nukes was expressed by US Secretary of Defense William Perry in a speech at the Stimson Center in 1994. In particular, he expressed concern about the danger of easily transportable small weapons, especially tactical nuclear weapons in Russia. In 1997, Alexander Lebed claimed that Russia had lost track of 100 out of 250 suitcase nuclear bombs. However, he later withdrew his claim and his credibility was questioned by others, including the US government. Alexander Lebed, a former Russian general and advisor who had been fired by President Yeltsin, made this claim in 1997. This concern about the danger of loose tactical nuclear weapons in Russia was also expressed by Secretary of Defense William Perry in a speech at the Stimson Center in 1994. He highlighted the prominent concern that these weapons, especially easily transportable ones, could pose a significant threat. The wording in these reports may indicate a lower level of confidence or the possibility that they were “may have” been, as reportedly listed by defense intelligence agencies.
The U.S. Department of State’s 2022 compliance report on nuclear non-strategic weapons mentioned that the report from NATO’s 2020 Annual Report listed both “artillery” and “landmines” as nuclear weapons. A Pentagon official informed Congress the following year that the Russian non-strategic nuclear arsenal includes nuclear artillery shells and landmines. However, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review by the Trump administration did not include landmines on its list of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. Despite rumors, there is no evidence to support the extraordinary claim made by Lebed, who later withdrew his claim without providing any evidence.
The annual reports from the U.S. Department of State often featured compliance control measures regarding Russian nuclear landmines. The 2020 report listed the atomic demolition mines as part of Russia’s “active” stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The 2022 report slightly modified the language to indicate that the active stockpile also includes nuclear mines. However, the 2021 report did not explicitly mention nuclear mines in the active stockpile.
Including nuclear mines (refer to image below), Russia’s “operational” non-strategic nuclear arsenal reinforces this fact. The aforementioned report, released in February 2023, was incorporated into a dedicated report concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons, which Congress had specifically asked for in conjunction with its endorsement of the New START treaty. The customary extensive section on the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and Russian non-strategic weapons does not encompass the most recent compliance report from 2023.
Russian Non-Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The decrease of the Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal reveals that the inventory at the conclusion of the Cold War was significantly higher. These figures are derived from the estimated range of 1,000-2,000 warheads indicated by subsequent assessments published by the U.S. Intelligence Community. During a briefing to NATO in 2009, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller stated that Russia had “3-5 thousand” warheads, which marked a significant reduction compared to the NPR estimate. The estimate presented in the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review in 2018 was “up to 2,000” non-strategic nuclear weapons, which closely aligns with the estimate we provided in the same year.
Interestingly, in order to be able to operate, dormant warheads would need to have those components reinstalled first. “Operational” warheads have all components installed; dormant warheads are part of the Department of Defense stockpile that includes both operational and dormant warheads. However, warheads awaiting dismantlement are not considered “operational” or part of an “operational stockpile” in the United States. This is intriguing because the Russian “operational stockpile” of 1,000-2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads included “warheads awaiting dismantlement,” as stated by the U.S. State Department in 2022.
Another part of the inventory may consist of nuclear artillery shells (although it is uncertain if nuclear landmines are part of that inventory). This suggests that some non-strategic Russian warheads, which are frequently portrayed in public debate as part of the inventory, may be retired and awaiting dismantlement.
The projected increase in Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons, primarily driven by the growth in Russia’s stockpile, is likely to significantly grow over the next decade, as Former Admiral Richard Charles, commander of STRATCOM, told Congress in 2020. In addition, there is uncertainty about the status of the U.S. Nuclear arsenal, which advocates for the modernization of the U.S. Nuclear arsenal.
The foundation for that projection is unclear and ambiguous. The U.S. Intelligence community asserts that Russia is definitely upgrading its arsenal and deploying more weapons that have the capability to carry two types of warheads. An additional query is the quantity of these launchers that will truly be designated for nuclear warheads. The most recent report from the U.S. State Department acknowledges a rise in Russia’s arsenal but warns that the extent of this increase is uncertain.
Projections of warhead deployments are partially influenced by the expected growth in the number of dual-capable launchers, but also by the increasing number of category weapons assigned to warheads.
The F-35A upgrade, known as Block 4, is intended to facilitate the integration of nuclear technology, which means that all F-35A aircraft will be assigned nuclear weapons and a nuclear posture. For example, fighter-bombers such as the F-16 and F-15E, which are dual-capable, will also be assigned nuclear weapons and included in the U.S. Nuclear arsenal.
A basic launcher with dual capabilities that serves as the foundation for warhead projections could potentially result in inflated figures.
In order to decrease the uncertainty surrounding Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons and the methods used by the U.S. Intelligence Community to make projections about them, it is crucial to inquire about these matters. There exists a significant amount of uncertainty regarding Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons and the approach employed by the U.S. Intelligence Community to forecast their behavior.